

Financing Ready-made Micro Businesses: A Case Study of National Bank of Pakistan

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to ascertain the causes of success or failure of two self-employment schemes cum financing ready-made micro businesses, 'Yellow Cab' and 'NBP Karobar' by National Bank of Pakistan and modality of launching and financing ready-made micro business at a very wide scale by the microfinance banks and institutions in Pakistan. The methodology included qualitative mode of inquiry and explanatory analysis of data. This research is undertaken in two stages. In the primary data collection method, at the first stage, one-on-one interviews were taken from the NBP officials having expertise in the relevant products affairs, at the second stage, a survey through interviews was undertaken in Karachi from borrowers of those products. The samples were selected through convenience procedure of non-probability sampling method. The findings of this research discover the potential of financing a wide range of ready-made micro businesses/enterprises at an extensive scale throughout the country to provide maximum self-employment cum entrepreneurial opportunities and nourishing the microfinance sector.

Keywords: Microfinance; yellow cab; NBP Karobar Pakistan.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

Microfinance is the provision of micro credit and offering the services of depositing savings, funds transfer, insurance, and other financial services to the customers, especially low income consumers, self-employed, and potential self-employed persons or entrepreneurs. However, only micro credit is the provision of very small credit or loans to people to generate self-employment, enhance entrepreneurial culture, income, eradicate poverty, develop human capital, and technology. These products are designed for those that lack collateral and have no or little credit history and do not meet the stringent criteria of bank loan. The historians found that the Franciscan monks established early microfinance institutions in the 15th century for the sake of community development in the shape of pawnshops (Helms, 2006). Modern-day microfinance emerged as a distinct industry in the 1970s in the wake of the work of Professor Muhammad Younas of Bangladesh. Microfinance schemes launched by Professor Mohammad Younas in Bangladesh proved very successful and inspired the whole world.

The concept of financing ready-made micro businesses or self-employment led products for micro enterprises is not a novel notion in Pakistan. In early 1992, the government induced the nationalized banks to launch 'yellow cab' or yellow taxi scheme under Prime Minister's Self-Employment Scheme to inaugurate self-employment and generate income at domestic level. The four national banks, Habib Bank Limited (HBL), United Bank Limited (UBL), National Bank of Pakistan (NBP), and First Women Bank partnered

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together in one way. HBL financed Rs. 8 billion, UBL financed Rs. 3 billion and NBP financed Rs. 1 billion in this project. The scheme could not accomplish its desired goals. Later on, in the last quarter of 2006, the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) launched 'NBP Karobar' scheme under the 'President Rozgar Scheme' to accomplish the milestones of self-employment and income generation. NBP launched various products under the scheme comprising of utility store, rickshaw, etc. The flagship characteristic of these initiatives was a very marginal interest of only 6% per annum, which was subsidized by the Government of Pakistan (GoP). GoP reimbursed the NBP for the discount rate difference (i.e. Karachi Inter Bank Offered Rate/KIBOR +2%) compensation against each case (NBP, 2011). The scheme went popular and assisted in improving livelihood and facilitating the populace, especially in the far flung areas.

1.2 Problem Statement

Many of the problems in our society are associated with poverty, unemployment, and increasing disparity among social classes, while microfinance is widely recognized as a powerful instrument to tackle such issues. NBP launched ready-made microfinance products that generated huge employment opportunities in Pakistan. The research about such microfinance products can discover the potential of such mega employment generation schemes/products in Pakistan and the challenges and risks that NBP underwent during launching of the products. Hence, this study will provide lessons for industry and academia about the domain of microfinance, particularly ready-made microfinance.

1.3 Research Objectives

The core objectives of the study are:

- To measure and undertake a comparative analysis of NBP's product, 'Yellow Cab' with 'NBP Karobar' in terms of profitability and recovery, and its impact on the income level of customers and
- To discover the potential of launching such products at a broader scale, even throughout the country.

1.4 Research Questions

The following core questions are raised and addressed in this research:

- How far the concept of financing ready-made micro businesses through NBP's products, 'Yellow Cab' and 'NBP Karobar' were successful in Pakistan?
- What are future prospects for financing ready-made micro businesses in Pakistan?

1.5 Significance and Scope of the Study

The study is a case study of National Bank of Pakistan (NBP), which analyzes the kudos of the bank in this nexus and identifies areas of improvement and future potential. The thematic scope of the study is micro finance. Moreover it is equally pertinent with the domains of economics as well as social sciences. The geographic scope of the study is confined to Karachi only.

1.6 Research Methodology

The study is a case of National Bank of Pakistan (NBP), which uses qualitative techniques to conduct formal interviews and survey through personal interviews. The study is longitudinal and data analysis is explanatory in nature. The sample size is 24 bankers (i.e. 15% of the total population) from all tiers of management of the department dealing with 'NBP Karobar' products, who were selected conveniently; and twenty five customers of 'NBP yellow cab' and fifty customers of 'NBP Karobar', were selected conveniently from various geographic locations of Karachi. The reason for unequal size of the two independent sample group was, the earlier scheme, 'NBP yellow cab' is almost two decades old, and hence it was hard to find the owners that bought the cabs in 1992 from NBP. The NBP database was helpful in developing a sampling frame to identify these customers scattered in various areas. These customers were contacted in person for a survey through interviews. The questionnaire contains structured as well as unstructured questions, which were developed as per situation. The mode of data analysis was descriptive or explanatory.

1.7 Delimitations of the Study

The chief delimitation of the study comprises of limited sample size, unequal sample size for two comparative products, time frame and financial resources and the geographical scope is confined to Karachi only. In addition, some of the respondents showed reluctance to answer because of time and interest concerns or felt it as a disclosure of secrecy.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Global Perspectives of Microfinance

Microfinance products were primarily devised for low income consumers and self-employed people, or potential self-employed and entrepreneurs. Microfinance products have a great nexus with poverty alleviation and income generation. It was estimated that one third of the world population, about 2 billion people are suffering from poverty related issues (Qureshi, 2010). The world has recognized the salience of microfinance in employment generation, entrepreneurial development, income generation, tapping indigenous opportunities, and alleviating extreme poverty. Envisaging Grameen Bank in Bangladesh as a global leader in microfinance products, many banks and micro finance institutions around the globe launched microfinance products to serve the deprived and unfortunate strata of the society. As micro businesses are very small businesses so they lack finance and various other inputs that they can buy with finance, such as state-of-the-art technology, trained management, skilled labor, and the ability to market their products with modern tools of branding, segmenting, target marketing, and advertising. Resultantly, their sales, exports, and profit in terms of value are also very marginal.

Many of the owners of micro businesses do not think of going to or availing formal financial institutes like banks and other financial institutions because of their stern formalities, complex documentary procedures, and collateral requirements. Many studies reveal positive impact of micro-finance on raising income level and quality of life of borrowers, and socio-economic development (Bardhan, 1980; Ghate et al., 1992; Herani, 2002 a & b; Herani, 2007; Herani et al., 2007; Herani, 2008; Pakistan & Gulf Economist, 2009; Rao, 1980; Sudan, 2007; & Westover, 2008) and (Bahaduri, 1983; Ghosh, 1986,

as cited by Jaffari et al., 2011). However, many studies uncover exploitation of borrowers and the poorer people through high interest rates of microfinance products (Bauer, et al., 2008; Mahto, 2004 & Westover, 2008).


Globally, there are 3000 plus micro financial institutions and together, they have supplied micro loans to approximately 100 million clients in last two decades, particularly to low-income and unemployed persons (Jaffari et al., 2011; Khushhali Bank, 2011; Micro-Credit Summit Campaign, 2007). In addition to the formal micro-financing channel, globally there are informal money-lending channels inclusive of money lenders and pawnbrokers who offer micro credit facilities to borrowers but their interest rates tend to be higher, because of high operating outlays when dealing with thousands of small customers (Robinson, 2001). A study reckoned that currently the global microfinance industry possesses US\$ 25 billion to meet the swift growth of the industry. However, it requires US\$ 250 billion (i.e. ten times greater than the present sum of funds) to reach the entire populace that is in dire need of such funds (Duetsche Bank, 2007). If the commercial banks lend to them, they presume risk in the absence of collateral that means no recourse in case of default. That's why bankers' priority is large-scale enterprises.

As the banks deals with a small number of borrowers, they incur a small outlay as processing charge on each transaction to verify credentials of the borrowers, repayment capacity, security offered, if any, and administration of outstanding loans, hence they believe in low cost and greater returns for a sustainable survival. But apparently, there appears a great deal of risk as presumed by micro lending institutions that calls for appropriate risk management measures (Goldfine, 2005). However, micro finance system may not serve its purpose and may fail unless well-managed. The evidence exhibits many reasons for failure such as high mark up rates, poor reach to potential customers, over indebtedness and extreme poverty of borrowers, flaws in administrative operations, and inadequate and complex regulations. However, worldwide microfinance institutes (MFIs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been paying due attention in lending to women as well as men, regardless of gender discrimination. Grameen Bank, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Association for Social Advancement (ASA), and Proshikkhan Shikkha Karmo (PROSHIKA) are some other giant NGOs cum MFIs in Bangladesh.

In India, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) took initiatives to develop the microfinance services. RBI devised micro, small, and medium enterprises act (MSME Act of 2004) to nourish micro enterprises along with the SME sector. In India, the microfinance programs are extended chiefly by microfinance institutions (MFIs) and self-help groups (SHGs) and the rate of micro loan recovery is claimed to be 98% by Small Industries Development Bank of India (Mahto, 2004). In Pakistan, the microfinancing products were firstly launched by the Ismaili Community, particularly, Masala Society in the 1950s. The community members chipped in just Rs. 0.50 (half rupee) and then, the responsible persons disbursed funds to community for establishing and expanding small enterprises (Herani, 2002). In Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), various financial institutions, MFIs, and some NGOs have taken initiatives for the uplift and sustainability of micro lending institutions. SBP has streamlined many policies and code of conduct for the provision of easy access to finance and financial services to the urban and especially rural masses. In the year 2000, the Government of Pakistan announced to establish its 1st microfinance bank in the name of Khushhali (means prosperity) bank to counter

unemployment and poverty. The Government of Pakistan inaugurated various schemes of microfinance, such as 'NBP Yellow Cab' and 'NBP Karobar', which were ready-made micro businesses.

2.2 Conceptual Framework (of NBP's Yellow Cab & Karobar Scheme)



The aforementioned model exhibits the relationship among various variables affecting the success of microfinance schemes of NBP, which are loan criteria/terms (covering risk management factors as well), customers knowledge (of scheme), loan processing, political involvement (in loan approvals), quality of products, bank services in customer dealing, and if executed appropriately, they leave an impact on the profitability of NBP, and the outcome variables display a positive impact of the schemes, which are innovated ready-made micro businesses and socio-economic development through mass employment generation.

3. Data Analysis and Presentation

The study undertook in-depth interviews from NBP officials and a survey through personal interviews from customers cum borrowers of NBP Karobar who availed Yellow Cab scheme and those that availed NBP Karobar product (i.e. rickshaw). The evaluation of survey through interviews from the customers that availed NBP Scheme 'Yellow Cab' suggests that: the participants learned about the scheme from varying sources including media, bank officials, relatives or friends. It was a collateral free financing with provision of personal guarantee, as a reasonable substitute of collateral, and a deposit of 10% equity margin. The loan repayment was resumed from the fourth month.

The quality of automobiles, particularly yellow cabs was satisfied. There were political involvements in the process of loan sanctioning. Most of the participants stated that the loan processing time was a big problem. Regarding customer dealing, many participants expressed that the behavior of the concerned bank officers was bureaucratic and typically rude, while some had no issue with respect to customer service. The cab drivers who drove the cabs by themselves and were pro drivers substantially made an income on it, while those that borrowed the cab and handed to someone else faced numerous problems. About half of the participants admitted that the scheme enabled them to save enough to slightly raise their quality of life and spend money on their families, while others disagreed and expressed their grievances about high mark up, resulting in a costly cab and hence they were unable to improve their quality of life. The participants believe that such schemes should be launched once again at a massive scale throughout the country, since there is a tremendous scope and it generates

employment, but at present the scope lies especially in heavy vehicles like vans, coasters, and buses. The evaluation of 'NBP Karobar' scheme from NBP officials dealing in the scheme through in-depth interviews could not become possible because the scheme was launched about two decades ago and all the pertinent officers were either moved to other departments, or retired, or left NBP, or some passed away. However, it was unearthed from many senior officers in the commercial banking group and the secondary data that the scheme went flop, the most portions of the funds (about 70%) from the total amount financed for Rs.1 billion were sunk, while it produced a positive impact on consumers' income and employment.

The evaluation of in-depth interviews from NBP officials dealing in 'NBP Karobar' scheme suggests that the NBP officials at various levels of management unanimously agreed that due to poor collection and recovery, the Bank suffered a loss, however, the NBP Karobar scheme was lucrative in terms of a high profit margin of 19%. Out of that, 6% was the mark up of NBP, plus 6+2% mark up was funded by the Government of Pakistan (GoP), plus 5 to 7% discount by vendors, which made a total of 19+% gross profit margin, while the Bank received 10% margin from the government against risk of credit loss on a total loan disbursement. NBP made efforts through its 'Movers and Shakers' team to recover rickshaws from default customers, which underwent an auction process. The scheme proved beneficial to customers, particularly rickshaws were highly demanded. Although some of the rickshaw owners make complaint about not earning enough from the product but our study revealed that after 10 hours of working, an average rickshaw driver earned Rs. 1,000 i.e. Rs. 30000+ per month. According to an internal study of NBP on the impact assessment of the scheme, it created 49,500 direct jobs and 586,500 indirect jobs, totaling to 636,000 jobs.

The core terms and conditions under the scheme were: the amount of loan for various products varied from Rs. 5,000-200,000; down payment 10% of the principal; monthly installment covered principal, mark up, and insurance; tenure of loan 2-5 years; mark up 6% per annum; required age of borrower 18-45 years; education, matriculation but leniency to women in PCO and tele-center products; nationality, Pakistani; employment status, unemployed; asset insurance of individual product; life and disability insurance of the borrower with government's assistance; and credit loss was also sustained by the government by 10% of the total loan disbursement. Regarding the loan criteria, initially the borrowers faced difficulties to arrange two personal guarantees and arranging 15% down payment. Later on, the bank waived such conditions and insisted on providing two references of two local persons and subsidized down payment to 10% of the principal. However, the borrowers that rented or sublet the rickshaws sometimes felt difficulties in loan repayment. Many borrowers complained about late receipt of rickshaws or other products, while the bank had to process countless loan applications and it underwent a scrutiny process of all their documents and credentials, including electronic credit information bureau (ECIB) report for any loan default at any financial institute.

The NBP officers replied that to a great extent, the scheme remained apolitical. Upon inquiring about the maladministration at the bank's end, the answers of the lower tier of management were different from that of the upper one. The NBP officers at lower rank admitted that in some cases, such loans were granted to people that were already employed at NBP, which was an explicit violation of the loan criteria. Their salaries were withheld, but eventually, were released and they enjoyed the loan too. However, the NBP officers at middle and upper rank declined such a situation. Most customers were

very satisfied from the quality of the rickshaws and all other products, but complaints were received about 'Chingchi Rickshaw' and 'Master Rickshaw' and observed surrender cases. The significant developments in various periods were, the scheme inaugurated from September 2006 was aggressively launched in April 2007, and then expired on August 2009. Initially, the target of the bank earmarked Rs. 100-105 billion for the scheme, to supply 1.2 million rickshaws, and generate 2.5 million employment opportunities. But upon evidence of slow collection, the Bank decided to inhibit the scheme in August 2009. Now efforts for recovery from delinquent borrowers are underway. One of the problems is that our society (at large) has very ill doctrine about debt, especially public debt. People believe that public money is their personal property. Such values compel the banks to be very conscious about launching such collateral free schemes for mass employment generation at massive scale. In these interviews, it was uncovered that one strong reason for failure of this scheme was no prompt collection/recovery, as many borrowers resumed paying their installments after 3 months of availing the loan, and some did so at the end of 7th month. The product managers of the scheme claimed that they studied the Grameen Bank's model and other models, where the borrowers instantly start repayment to the lender, just from day two, which was not the feature of this scheme.

Secondly, the way surrendered or recovered rickshaws were auctioned appears unscrupulous because these were sold well below their book value and market value. If the market value of a rickshaw was Rs. 150,000, it was auctioned just for Rs. 60,000. However, all the tactics were effectuated to exhibit artificial transparency, such as market value determination by outsourced technical persons/firms, auctions announced in news papers, and open auctions in front of general public and NBP managers. Thirdly, the relevant officers/experts did not concentrate on making an accurate demand forecast for products other than rickshaw, resulting in an explicit failure.

The evaluation of survey through interviews from the customers that availed NBP Karobar Scheme 'Rickshaw,' suggests that the customers/borrowers became aware of the said scheme from varying sources including media, bank officials, friends and family members. Although they preferred personal guarantees over pledge of a property, they were unable to provide two personal guarantees, so they were waived of. It became a collateral free financing with a deposit of 10% equity margin, where installments started after three months. The interest/mark up was reasonable. Not all, but many of the borrowers did not feel any difficulty in loan repayment or even debt retirement. The quality of all products, particularly rickshaw was satisfied. Sazgar and Superstar proved as super hit brands, while 'Chingchi Rickshaw' and 'Master Rickshaw' were highly unaccepted, however they were accepted in rural areas because of low-price and affordability factors. There was less political involvement in loan sanctioning. For many, it took a lot of time and difficulties in getting the loan sanctioned, due to procedural delays and embarrassments. Many stated complaints and accused the staff for unprofessional and unfriendly dealings.

Most of the participants admitted that their income was substantially increased from the scheme. On the other hand, some believed that their income remained almost the same, as they earned the same amount earlier through some laborious work, but now (at that time) they own an asset or micro business. The scheme made a considerable positive impact on their lives and improved the living conditions of their families and they spent more on their family's hygienic and educational needs. However, some

denied any positive impact owing to ever-escalating inflation and other social and economic problems. The participants favor the launching of such schemes and programs by the government or the private sector to address the evils of poverty, hunger, and unemployment. But the government should also take other measures to drastically curb the hard core issues of uncontrollable inflation, bad governance, and increasing social disparity. Otherwise, the economic benefits of such schemes, programs, and projects could not be proved sustainable in the long-run.

Figure 3.1A
Loans, Recovery, and Outstanding Balance of NBP Karobar
 (values in billions of Pak Rupees)




Figure 3.1B
% of Recovery and Balance




Figure 3.1A displays that the total loan issued for 'NBP Karobar' was Rs. 5.19 billion, the recovery is Rs. 2.66 billion, and the outstanding balance is Rs. 2.53 billion. Note that the figures in graphs are rounded in Pakistani rupees in billions, and the outstanding amount shown in above graph excludes interest addition. As shown in figure 3.1B, in percentage terms, the recovery is 51% and the outstanding balance of loan is 49%.

The scheme is inactive or expired and only the recovery of installments on loans issued up to the year 2009 is underway. But the officials perceive a great risk of bad debts as well. However, the annual reports of the bank do not disclose any bad debts and only mention one account, write offs, in which it combines all of its write offs under different heads.

Figure 3.2 A
Loan Applications, Acceptance,
and Decline (in numbers)




Fig 3.2 B
% of Loan Acceptance and Decline






Figure 3.2 A displays that the total loan applications for 'NBP Karobar' were 75,000, out of which 49,902 were accepted, and 25,098 were declined. The figure 3.2B displays that in percentage terms, acceptance of loan applications were 67% and rejection rate was 33%, which evidenced that the demand of such products or loans was higher than the applications entertained.

Figure 3.3 A
Acceptance of Loan Applications for Rickshaws and Other Products



Source: NBP Internal Database (2011)

Figure 3.3 B
% of Loans for Rickshaws and Other Products



Source: NBP Internal Database (2011)

Figure 3.3 A shows that the total loan applications accepted for 'NBP Karobar' were 49,902, out of which 49,500 were for rickshaws, and only 402 were for other products under the scheme. The figure 3.3B displays that in percentage terms, the loan applications

for rickshaws were 99.19% and other products were 0.81%, which evidenced a high interest of borrowers in transport product, especially rickshaws.

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusion

NBP launched two mega microfinance schemes to generate mass employment in the country. Indeed, both schemes offered ready-made micro businesses, particularly yellow cabs and rickshaws to the unemployed youth. Both schemes were government sponsored. Under the umbrella of Prime Minister's Self-Employment Scheme, NBP launched 'Yellow Cab' in 1992. Under the scheme, duty-free transport vehicles, yellow taxis, vans, coasters, and buses were imported and financed to unemployed youth. As there were political involvements in loan sanctions and getting commissions from vendors, along with maladministration at banks' end, so ultimately the scheme turned out to be a 'fiasco', resulting in heavy losses to the banks, and revenue department, since the vehicles were imported duty-free. Later on, NBP launched 'NBP Karobar' scheme in 2006 under the umbrella of President Rozgar scheme to provide self-employment opportunities for the unemployed youth. Like the early scheme, it was also a government sponsored scheme, having a subsidized mark up of only 6% per annum for borrowers, while the bank received a handsome margin from the government and vendors.

The products offered under the scheme included utility store, mobile general store, rickshaw, public call office, and tele-centers. The products were supplied by local vendors and few brands of rickshaws from Chinese vendors. Although there was relatively less political involvement in loan sanctions or processing, and relatively less maladministration by the bank, it exercised some contemporary tools to mitigate the risk, but ultimately like its predecessors, the scheme flopped. In both schemes, an easy loan criterion was devised, having 10% equity margin and a personal guarantee rather than collateral, while the borrowers were relaxed up to three months, after which the recovery started through monthly installments. Indeed, the missing feature of both schemes was poor recovery.

By comparing the two mega schemes launched by NBP in different tenures, it is learnt that both schemes proved utter failures in terms of profitability and recovery but left a positive impact on borrowers by generating employment and income, as the products observed high demand and wide acceptance of customers. Yellow Cab was highly politicized (in loan sanctions), while NBP Karobar Rickshaw was relatively less politicized; both schemes were very risky (in terms of recovery), and mismanaged by the bank, but somehow modern tools of management were utilized in NBP Karobar. The end result raises questions on accountability and transparency. It is surprising to note that the officials of NBP Karobar studied the model of Grameen Bank of Bangladesh that pioneered in modern microfinance, but they ignored the concepts of savings and prompt recovery from borrowers on daily or regular basis.

4.2 Recommendations

Doing it the right way that means executing the microfinance schemes of NBP in a result-oriented way. The apt lending criteria could be, in addition to the criteria adopted for approving the loan applications, the applicants should be trained and convinced to open an account at NBP and submit in advance the post-dated checks (in Bank's favor) against the loan, deposit their revenues at least weekly basis. Upon non-payment, the Bank should instantly take stern actions, issue notices to defaulting borrowers, trace the vehicle(s) through tracker devices and even seize the vehicles. Those vehicles could be first brought to workshops for any maintenance through an insurance cover, and then could be sold at market price through authorized show-room dealers.

Financing alternatives for micro businesses include financing ready-made micro businesses through franchise outlets or franchise dealership agreements (between a franchisor and a franchisee) to tap demand-oriented lucrative business opportunities; through lease agreements, where the leasing company is advised to exclude collateral requirement and ensure its assets through an insurance cover and installation of a tracker device into the individual assets; through Islamic banking products, such as profit and loss sharing products of Mudarba and Musharika, or Takaful/Islamic insurance; through village banking, such as in large-size villages; through group-based lending, like the models adopted by Grameen Bank or Kashaf Foundation in Pakistan, which encourage formation of a group of potential entrepreneurs, train them for a new business owned by the group, encourage savings and recovery, and patronize through consultancy, monitoring and evaluation throughout the project's tenure.

Institutional development for microfinancing, such as training and consultancy services by NBP, other banks/MFIs/NGOs for micro-credit programs/schemes (other than ready-made businesses), and their staff should be well-groomed to serve the clients at their best and to expedite the loan process, and play an advisory role to clients. They should record the input as key facts and figures into a tailor-made computerized software, which should provide a cost-benefit analysis and financial forecasting and projections within real-time. Establishment of microfinance cum entrepreneurial development institutes linked with partner microfinancing organizations, and upon mentoring of new entrepreneurs or capacity building of existing entities, they can be encouraged to devise a business plan, which will be entertained for funding by partner microfinance organizations.

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